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Losing one’s place 
In a remarkable analysis of religious life in sixteenth century Lyon, Natalie Zemon Davis 
analysed Protestantism and Catholicism as two different spatial languages through which the 
territory of the city was interpreted and performed.1 Catholic ceremonial, organised around 
the liturgical year but also in the build-up to the four fortnight-long fairs held in the town 
every year, was sensitive to the natural features of Lyon, especially the hill of Fourvière that 
dominated the town, and the two rivers: the “feminine”, slow-moving Saône, and the 
“masculine”, forceful, and often dangerous Rhône. These features were the continuous focus 
of festivals and ceremonies throughout the liturgical year. For example, at Pentecost, 
processions would pass the Chapel of the Holy Ghost at the end of the bridge over the Rhône, 
marking the importance of that river to the life of the city, and asking for protection from its 
unruliness. Nearby, young men would dress up as horses – chevaux fous – and dance through 
the streets that led from the end of the peninsula where the two very different rivers 
“embraced”. On holy days such as Corpus Christi, processions with banners, bells, candles 
and torches would also move between different key sacred sites in the city, symbolically 
overcoming the division between different communities represented by the Saône, and thus 
giving the city identity and protection.  
The Calvinist Huguenots had a very different orientation to urban space. As Davis 
puts it, “[t]he streets through which the dark-clad Calvinists marched singing their Psalms 
were not sacred routes, but avenues for the expression of the believer’s faith, a message of 
communion to other Christians and of reproof to the canon-counts. That the sacred could be 
enclosed in a thing — in a host, in a bone, in a building, in a piece of land — was a notion 
smacking of idolatry.” The Calvinist crowds thus performed the city in a very different way: 
they “purged the Catholic holy places ... opening urban space and making it more uniform 
and available for exchange, traffic and human communication.” They smashed crosses at 
crossroads, built public squares on top of old cemeteries, and set up shops in old chapels. The 
Calvinists recognised that places were not all the same: for example, places could be 
consecrated to prayer or other holy usage, or they could be polluted by licentiousness. Yet 
such characteristics were seen as accidental rather than essential features of the places in 
which they were encountered, and their sacral landscape did not exhibit the dramatic highs 
and lows of spiritual intensity of that of the Catholics. Instead, the environment was “held 
together by a middling tension, by listening and by watchfulness.”2 
This dramatic contrast lends credence to the idea that the Reformation may have 
played a key role in the constitution of the modern experience of space: in the displacement 
of what Henri Lefebvre called absolute space in favour of abstract space.3 Absolute space is 
complex and discontinuous; it is made up of different kinds of “place” with radically different 
qualitative properties: enclosures and openings, interiors and exteriors, public and intimate 
places, places of joy and of desolation.4 Furthermore, incommensurable bonds between 
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people, places, symbols, supernatural realities, memory and custom serve to fragment 
absolute space into sites that have to be known through practices of naming and storytelling 
rather than those of surveying and measuring. By contrast, abstract space is merely a 
container for objects and activities; it is a space made suitable for practices of comparison, 
exchange and movement; it is the space of modern science, of bureaucratic rationalism, of 
market relations. Abstract space is a kind of space in which “place” – topos – is no longer 
primary and fundamental, but is at best a ghostly, secondary epiphenomenon caused by the 
arrangement of objects in space. The Reformation, Davis’s account suggests, helped to lay 
the ground for the modern experience of abstract space, by breaking with what I will call the 
“archaic” experience of certain places and objects as having intrinsic connections to sacral 
power. And, as capitalism and modern technology spread around the world from their origins 
on the North Atlantic rim, it could be argued that they took with them not just a Protestant 
ethic of work, but a Protestant experience of space. 
The link between abstract space and the erosion of a sense of place has become 
particularly apparent in the most recent phase of modernity, commencing in the late twentieth 
century, dominated as it has been by the globalisation of capitalism and increasing mobility 
of people and commodities. Manuel Castells5 argues that in this “network society” there is 
clash between two spatial logics, between the subordinated space of place, of historically 
rooted human experiences,6 and the dominant space of flows, a space made suitable for and 
constituted by the mobility of people, things and information.7 This mobility (both real and 
virtual) is conditioned by, and in turn reproduces, a logic of abstract space: each given 
locality is tending to become not a unique place, with its own associations and meanings for 
those dwelling or even visiting there, but a particular combination of abstract characteristics 
that mark it out as similar or different to other places. The multiple mobilities of “liquid 
modernity” have thus produced a mindset for which places are collections of abstract 
characteristics in a mobile world, ever easier to be visited, appreciated and compared, but not 
known from within.8 People are increasingly seeing and experiencing the world from afar, “at 
home” only in movement and in comparison.9 
Even Europe, with its dense mosaic of languages and cultures, has been increasingly 
subjected to the logic of abstract space; Jensen and Richardson argue that the contemporary 
neoliberal approach to European integration is now one that tries to construct European space 
as a monotopia – “an organised, ordered and totalised space of zero-friction and seamless 
logistic flows” of goods, services, capital, labour and technologies across the Union.10 This 
has given rise to a proliferation of what Marc Augé calls ‘non-places’, which, while taking up 
quantitative space, lack the kind of qualities we think of as making places.11 Thus it could be 
argued that the Reformation helped to create the cultural conditions not only for capitalism 
(Weber) and modern science (Merton), but also for lay-bys, lorry parks, shopping malls and 
airport terminals.12 
In this paper I want to reflect on the role of the Reformation in the transformation of 
our experience of place. Firstly I want to broaden this initial claim that the Reformation 
helped to effect a shift from absolute to abstract space, or from place to space, by situating 
this development within the longue durée of western religious history. In doing this I draw on 
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the analysis that I developed in Nature, Technology and the Sacred, which explored how our 
modern ideas of nature and technology are shaped by western religious history.13 In this 
book, I drew on the work of Max Weber, Robert Bellah, Jürgen Habermas and Marcel 
Gauchet to develop an account of how the western experience of the world has passed along a 
highly distinctive and contingent historical trajectory through the last two millennia – a 
succession of “orderings of the sacred” which together I term the “long arc of monotheism”. 
In the next section I will draw on this analysis to help understand the transformation of the 
experience of place. 
But secondly, I suggest that it is too simplistic to decry the Reformation in this regard 
and lament the loss of absolute space. As Davis herself argues, the Calvinists of sixteenth 
century Lyon were engaged not in a disenchantment of the world, but in a redefinition of its 
relationship to the holy. I will suggest that the reshaping of the experience of place in 
Western history is part of a cultural struggle between monotheism and what I call “archaic 
religion”, in which spiritual power is seen as attached to specific people, things and objects. I 
will argue that the Reformation promised a final overcoming of archaic religion, and the 
possibility of a new experience of space and place. The hypermodern dissolution of space 
into shopping malls, gated communities and global flows of commodities may have been 
facilitated by the Protestant spatial logic, but it was not necessitated by it. Thirdly, I will thus 
argue for the possibility of a distinctive (post)Christian mode of placing, one which offers 
liberation from a bondage to place without thereby condemning the world and its inhabitants 
to placelessness.  
 
Place in western religion 
The branching path that Western religion has taken over the last two or three millennia is 
extraordinary complex and resists schematic analysis – especially by any schema that 
attempts to present it as an almost inevitable teleological unfolding, as evolutionary social 
theorists such as Habermas might claim. However, it is possible to discern a broad pattern. In 
tracing this path, we will pass through the unified sacro-natural cosmos of the primal and 
archaic sacred, the transcendental dualism of the monotheistic and Protestant sacred, and the 
immanent sacred of the modern and postmodern sacred (see Figure 1). The transition between 
these stages are generally not abrupt, but gradual and often highly conflictual; at any one 
place and time different orderings of the sacred might be clashing with one another. 
Nevertheless, overall, the West underwent a passage into and out of monotheism, with a 
momentous effect on western thought in general, and on the experience of place in particular, 
because of the way that the divine was separated from nature and place, purified, and then 
recombined with it. In one sense, the decline of monotheism in the West returns us to the 
unified cosmos of the primal sacred; but in another it leaves us in a very different landscape 
from the one in which we started.  
 
PRIMAL ARCHAIC MONOTHEISTIC PROTESTANT MODERN POSTMODERN 
monistic dualistic immanent 
multiple 
space 
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The story of the long arc of monotheism starts with what I call the primal sacred, typical of 
hunter-gatherer societies, in which there is no clear distinction between the natural and the 
supernatural. The world is not understood as the unified creation of a transcendent and unique 
creator God, but as the ongoing interplay of multiple, this-worldly agencies.  In this sacral 
ordering, mythical narrative is not seen as referring to a separate, heavenly realm but is 
woven into the empirical details of the physical world. Particular features of the landscape 
might be seen as having particular spiritual significance, but every natural feature is 
experienced as related to the actions of mythical beings. However, these beings are not seen 
as controlling the world, nor are they worshipped as “gods”; instead, they are approached 
through identification and the “acting out” of primal myths, or through mundane forms of 
social interaction. The purpose of such rituals is to secure the reproduction of life within this 
world, rather than to escape it or to live according to laws originating from outside it.14  
However, as the rise of agriculture brings a relative distancing from the natural world 
and new forms of social organisation based on the concentration of power, a rather different, 
archaic sacred emerges, for example in the “pagan” cultures that preceded the emergence 
and spread of Judaism, Christianity and Islam in the Middle East and Europe Like primal 
religion, archaic religion is similarly monistic in its experience of the world as a unified 
“natural-divine cosmos”, and is similarly concerned with securing existence in this world 
rather than with other-worldly salvation.15 But with the development of priests and other 
intermediaries between humans and spiritual power there is a relative shift from magic – the 
ad hoc, circumstantial meeting of needs and crises – to religion “proper” – a systematic 
regulation of relations with gods and other supernatural beings.16 Importantly for present 
purposes, sacred, natural and worldly hierarchies are seen as continuous – resulting, for 
example, in African ideas of divine kingship, where an individual is seen as encapsulating 
sacred order and power. A common characteristic of the archaic sacred is thus the marking 
out of certain places, people or objects as having a privileged relationship with the sacred, 
and other things as relatively profane. The genius loci of Roman religion belongs properly in 
this ordering of the sacred, in which specific parts of nature are protected by tutelary spirits 
that have to be propitiated.17  
With the birth of “axial” or “world” religions such as Judaism and Christianity, the 
supernatural powers of ancient divinities are gathered together into the idea of the numinous, 
monotheistic God, and expelled from the empirical world into a supernal reality. Western 
religion thereby progressively leaves the monistic cosmos of the primal and archaic orderings 
of the sacred for a dualistic monotheistic sacred. In this ordering of the sacred – that 
inhabited by the Catholics of Lyon described by Davis – religion continues to operate through 
the material and the bodily in ways that echo primal and archaic religion, but the sacred is 
ordered around a new dualism of the natural and the supernatural. The individual starts to 
undergo a process of becoming more clearly separated from his or her environment, as 
experience is increasingly organised around vertical relations of dependency on and 
obligation to priest, saint and God, rather than around horizontal relations with the natural, 
social and supernatural worlds.18 Yet, in medieval Christianity, as in archaic religion, 
supernatural realities are still mapped on to physical features. Relics and places of worship 
are scattered everywhere – in chapels, springs, fountains, woods, as well as great urban 
centres – a sacred topography which organises worship, pilgrimage and site-specific rituals.19 
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However, the meanings of these features are apprehended in a different way than they would 
be in primal and archaic religion – as pointing to external, higher realities.20 Natural objects, 
and not just words, are seen as referring – to other objects and events in nature and history, 
but finally to moral and spiritual truths as laid out in scripture. This semiotic subordination of 
the natural to the supernatural world – the reading of nature and place as “about” spiritual 
truths – both reinforces and expresses the move away from the monism of the primal and 
archaic sacred: the highest values are those associated not with the cyclic, homeostatic 
maintenance of this world but with the anticipation of the next. 
The emergence of the Protestant sacred sees a radicalisation of this division between 
the natural and supernatural, as the Reformation strips away the institutional and supernatural 
hierarchies that both constituted and spanned the gulf between the transcendent divine and 
the world. The divine is thus removed from this world in a more absolute sense – becomes 
more infinite, unconditioned and unknowable – and with seemingly paradoxical 
consequences. The gulf between creator and creation is made at once infinite and 
infinitesimal, absolute and vanishingly small; at the same time as the Reformation amplifies 
the gulf between the empirical and transcendent worlds, the latter is also brought close to 
each individual and to the natural world. As Weber argued, the very idea of what it is to serve 
God is transformed: no longer is it conceived primarily in terms of devotional or ascetic acts 
to be carried out at specific places and times of heightened spiritual significance, or as the 
responsibility solely of the cloistered few.21 Instead, the duty to God is experienced as an 
inner orientation, one towards a divine command that has to be acted out in all areas of 
profane life. This formulation allows the centred self of the monotheistic sacred to operate 
outside world-denying practices and sacred spaces, amidst the complexities of social life. The 
unmediated relation with the divine meant that religious action is now “conceived to be 
identical with the whole of life”, and the world to be an arena in which to work out the divine 
command.22 As we saw with the Huguenots of Davis’s Lyon, the spatial correlate of this is a 
shift from a complex, discontinuous “absolute” space to a unified, homogeneous “abstract” 
space. The conception of the natural world, too, is transformed by this shift, in ways that 
favour the rise of modern science; matter comes to be seen as wholly passive, and space as 
continuous and homogenous, so that the laws that God has impressed on matter can operate 
identically at all points in the universe.23 
With the emergence of what I call the modern sacred, the transcendent axis is pulled 
into the very empirical world that was constituted by its ejection, producing a new 
immanentist ordering of the sacred, grasped through Enlightenment reason or Romantic 
sensibility. Being and order, instead of being seen as deriving from a supernatural source 
external to empirical reality, are increasingly seen as properties of that reality itself. The 
world thereby comes to be seen as profane in a newly radical sense – not just as being less 
sacred than its divine source and reference point, but as having no relation to the sacred at all. 
The transcendent axis, now introjected into the material world as an immanent ordering 
principle, still operates in a hidden way to maintain the idea of a single truth and abstract 
space. But with the emergence of the modern sacred, we see the demise of that crucial world-
relation that emerged with the axial religions and the monotheistic sacred: the sense that this 
world points towards the next one either by symbolising transcendent truths or preparing the 
faithful for eternal life. Instead, there is a focus on the endless reproduction of immanent life-
processes within this world. 
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Finally, in the postmodern sacred – which does not supplant but in various ways 
coexists with the modern experience of space – we see a more thoroughgoing collapse of the 
organizing dualism of the monotheistic and Protestant sacred, and the emergence of a 
multiple reality, one filled with and constituted by different cosmologies, worldviews and 
experiences of place grounded not in organised religion but in subjective experience.24 With 
the dropping of the doctrinal certainties and Puritan character ideals of early-modern religion, 
religious action thus becomes in a sense even more demanding than it was within the 
Protestant sacred, with a growing imperative for each individual to work out their own 
spiritual meanings, whether inside or outside the structures of organized religion.25 Under 
these conditions it is the “aesthetic community” that is the paradigm form of sociality – a 
community that “has no other foundation to rest on but widely shared agreement, explicit or 
tacit (that is) woven entirely from the friable threads of subjective judgements.”26 Space is 
experienced in multiple ways that are contingent on the membership of these elective, 
affectual tribes.27  This ordering of the sacred is encountered in the contemporary, heterotopic 
city with its multiple, overlain spatial orders of meaning – its numerous competing spirits of 
space kept alive by the city’s varied inhabitants and visitors. 
In what kind of place does this journey leave us? The rise and fall of “absolute” space 
seems to have deposited us in a postmodern experience of space that shares features with the 
monistic cosmos of the primal sacred in which our story started – the world, once again, is 
experienced as neither dependent on an external sacred reality, nor organised according to a 
single logic of sacrality and power. Yet the journey through the long arc of monotheism also 
transforms human experience. This passage initially abstracts space, making it possible to 
experience the world as a unified domain whose operation is capable of being grasped as a 
whole rather than a collection of independent agencies and sources of power, and as a 
homogenous space without centres of sacral power. But then, with the rise of a postmodern 
register a further dimension is added to the experience of space: this abstraction itself is 
abstracted, so that even the experience of existing in the shared, abstract space of modernity 
is dimmed, and instead people increasingly feel themselves as inhabiting private worlds of 
meaning. So, while contemporary experience is “after monotheism”, in that is no longer 
characterised by a belief in the radical, ongoing dependency of the being and becoming of the 
world on a transcendent creator God, it is also “after monotheism” – transformed by the 
passage through monotheism into something quite different. And a crucial element of that 
difference is the abstraction of space and loss of the intense sense of place typically 
experienced by members of pre-modern societies. 
 
Place and power 
There are many reasons one might lament this loss of place. One reason is cultural and 
spiritual: that the dilution of place represents an impoverishing of human experience. If there 
were no places, how – and where – could Dasein, being-in-the-world, “take place”?28 This, I 
take it, is one of the key insights of Tim Ingold’s work on space and dwelling, in which the 
modern experience of space is contrasted with the perception of the environment 
characteristic of indigenous peoples and found wanting.29 According to this view, the dweller 
in abstract space is in a state of privation, alienated from their environment, no longer capable 
of the participatory relationship with the world that is seen as a primary dimension of 
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authentic human being-in-the-world. But another reason to lament the abstraction of space is 
political. Historically, the abstraction of space has been a key element in the strengthening of 
the power of the centralised state and of disembedded market relations. The modern state 
requires and reinforces the abstraction of space across its territory, unifying it through a 
single system of relationships and duties, and a single logic of representation which makes 
the territory and what happens in it “legible” to disciplinary state power. Markets, too, 
operate dependent on space being abstracted and “striated” through mechanisms of 
reification, standardisation, quantification and motility.30 This move from absolute to abstract 
space generally has the effect of tipping the balance of power away from the local and the 
situational and towards more distant, abstract and often unforgiving forms of power.31 Even 
the postmodern individual can serve to strengthen the disembedding power of markets, by 
taking the form of the consumer whose subjective experience and preferences cannot be 
gainsaid.32  
However, I want to argue that it is not so clear that the contrast between absolute and 
abstract space is a simple one between good “place” and bad “space”. The geographer 
Doreen Massey33 argues that that overly stark contrasts between space and place, such as 
those made by Tuan34 and Castells35, makes place too rooted, and thereby too resistant to 
reflexivity and to progressive social dynamics. According to this view, an element of 
abstraction in the experience of space is to be welcomed, ethically and politically. In terms of 
the language that I am using in this chapter, one might say that a strong sense of place is 
linked to the archaic sacred, and that the tension between absolute and abstract space in 
Western history is thus implicated in a wider spiritual struggle over the nature of social, 
natural and divine power. 
From a Protestant point of view, the Reformation is a more systematic working-
through of a key move made by the arrival of Christianity. Marcel Gauchet’s analysis of the 
development of Western religion can help us to think through this argument, if we extend his 
analysis from the domain of social relations to that of space and power.36 Gauchet suggests 
that in the West the notion of political rule had been initially constituted in the context of 
what we are calling the archaic sacred, by the making of explicit connections between 
specific empirical people, objects and places and divine power. In many ways, the 
incarnational logic of Christianity seems to continue that particular disposition of the sacred; 
God was born in a particular man, at a particular place, at a particular time. However, as 
Gauchet argues, Christianity brings about a radical departure from the “organic interlocking 
of the Natural and the Supernatural” that is characteristic of the archaic sacred.37 Unlike the 
warrior Messiahs predicted by many Jewish cults, Jesus is an “inverted Messiah”, in whom 
divine power is identified not with the highest – the sovereign – but with the lowest – the 
weak and excluded. In contrast to the divine kingship of the archaic sacred, this performed 
not a continuity but a radical gulf between heaven and Earth.38 After Christ, Gauchet 
suggests, no one person – and, we can add, no one place – could claim uniquely to inhabit the 
fulcrum between the natural and the supernatural.  
Whereas a traditional messiah would have preached war, and thus reaffirmed the 
primacy of the collective, Christ preaches love and peace, constituting an interiority to human 
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experience which permitted individuals a new distance from the social bond. Similarly, the 
infinite distance of the Christian God and the refusal of the demonstrations of magical power 
that were characteristic of the archaic sacred led to new forms of collective being, where 
distanced individuals were gathered together into a salvation community distinct from 
political power, paradigmatically represented by the notion of “Church”. Because the 
Incarnation had taken a form which broke with the sacral continuities of archaic religion, a 
yawning gap had opened up between divine and earthly truth. This separation of sacred and 
earthly authority meant that individuals were thrown back on themselves to make sense of 
sacral truths in terms of their own inner understanding. The Church at once symbolized and 
promised to fill that gap, but in a way such that “what legitimated the Church's existence – 
the human understanding’s uncertainty about revealed truth – simultaneously justifies 
challenging its authority.”39 Thus the breaking of the connection between divine and earthly 
rule gave the individual the right to withdraw assent from worldly power, helping constitute 
the individual as a centre of consciousness and judgement in their own right, developments 
which lead up to concepts of individual conscience central to modern democracy. The spatial 
correlate of this social transformation – of the shift from an understanding of “virtue” as an 
external and objective power to that of an internal and subjective conscience – is the 
displacement of absolute by abstract space: the separation of power and significance from 
particular locations, and the rise of a new experience of space in which the moral individual 
is centre-stage. 
Yet, even in the modern world, spatial politics is still partly shaped by the archaic 
sacred.  There are many examples of space being organised materially and semiotically in a 
way that privileges certain sites over others, and subordinates the individual to a prescribed 
spatial ordering of value. For example, it is not only imperial cities like Beijing and Paris that 
are laid out to concentrate symbolic power. Even the apparent placelessness of contemporary 
global finance is organised in ways that favour centres such as Wall Street and the City of 
London; by contrast, the transport infrastructures of developing world spaces such as Africa 
and Latin America are laid out as “open veins”, designed for extraction.40 Aesthetic 
representations of nature and landscape are frequently used to invoke ideas of nation in a 
revival of modes of sacralisation characteristic of the archaic sacred.41 The collective 
awestruck moments experienced by Americans in the face of “their” nature and technology 
seem to mark out the American nation as having a privileged connection to the universal 
destiny of humankind.42  
And even environmental thought, so often critical of existing structures of social 
power, can draw on archaic modes of spatial ordering. The ideology of conservation in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries was conditioned by a colonialism which itself had roots in 
the archaic sacred’s notions of continuity between earthly hierarchies and divine power, as 
evidenced in its singling out of particular landscapes, wildlife habitats and species for 
concern and protection. Even the contemporary concern for global nature can be understood 
as a reinstatement of the archaic sacred at the level of the world itself: where once tutelary 
spirits watched over particular forests or particular species, now it is nature as a whole which 
is sacralised. For the critics of the technological domination of nature, nature is guided and 
guarded by its own immanent teleology, sometimes personified as Gaia.43 For the proponents 
of global environmental management, by contrast, the environment is under the protection of 
the abstract ruler of democratic society, who shapes and optimizes it for his own interests, 
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interests rendered sublime and universal through the language of technical reason.44 In both, 
the sacrality of nature brooks no argument; the ritual demands of the tutelary god of nature 
are absolute and non-negotiable. 
Ultimately, even the placelessness of modern experience can be seen as an archaic 
sacralisation of abstract space itself, one which produces either a blasé indifference to place – 
a modern version of Stoic apathy – or a subordination to a global imperative that represents a 
recapture of human freedom.  It appears that the emancipatory potential of monotheism to 
break the archaic equation between sacred and profane power and thereby opening up a new 
space of freedom for human being-in-the-world has been far from fully realised. Without the 
transcendent axis, without the idea of a divinity beyond the empirical world, nature would 
likely have remained conceived as a cyclical realm of violence seen as symbolically 
underwriting a conservative social order, rather than as capable of peaceable coexistence with 
a human social order constituted though relations of gift and speech – what Klaus Eder calls 
the “bloodless” tradition within Western culture, a tradition which refuses the symbols of 
earthly social power that are grounded in the totemism of the archaic sacred.45 Yet in the 
modern experience of place we can see that even the abstraction of space itself has become 
subordinated to the logic of the archaic sacred, thereby frustrating the emancipatory power of 
this move.  What we need in order to prevent this thwarting, I want to suggest, is to reform 
reformed space. 
 
The reformation of the reformation of place 
How can we escape archaic relations between space and power without being recaptured by 
the sacralisation of abstract space and consigned to the placelessness of much modern 
experience?  I have recently suggested that clues to such an escape can be found in the work 
of Søren Kierkegaard, who, while not directly talking about space, shows us how reformed 
space can itself be reformed.46 In The Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard uses the life of Socrates 
to illustrate the idea that the life of “immediacy”, simply living within the moral horizon of 
one’s own culture is inconsistent with the genuinely ethical life.47 For Kierkegaard, Socrates’ 
ironic self-distancing from the culture into which he had happened to be born, and indeed 
from the concrete details of his own life, was the awakening of subjectivity itself, without 
which there can be no genuine moral responsibility. This applies to the archaic sacred and 
place: to be able to distance oneself from a place, to understand its contingency, to be able to 
compare and contrast it with other places, is the awakening of a spatial subjectivity which is 
also necessary for justice and responsibility. 
However, as Andrew Collins points out, a simple negation of concrete existence, a 
severing of private meaning from the shared, emplaced world of culture, can by itself only 
offer a negative freedom, not a positive form of life.48 Kierkegaard himself recognised this; in 
Either/Or he carries out a caustically perceptive critique of the blasé Romantic aesthete in his 
depiction of the character “A” – egotistical, bored and incapable of engagement.49 He argues 
that the very inadequacy of A’s existence is connected to the fact that the ironic attitude is not 
fully carried through. Similarly, with the liberation of the modern individual from absolute 
space, the archaic sacred is reinstated at the level of abstract space itself, and rendered 
immune from critique. The Romantic aesthete is not free but captured by his or her own 
alienation from the public world, by an ironic attitude that becomes a new immediacy, a new 
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and equally constraining horizon of thought. Similarly, the dweller in abstract modern 
placelessness is not free from the intertwining of worldly and supernatural power, but is 
recaptured at a higher level by the sacralisation of abstract space itself. 
In his later Concluding Unscientific postscript, Kierkegaard, writing under the 
pseudonym Climacus, suggested a way out of this trap.50 For Climacus’ ironist, the ironic 
distancing from immediacy is only a transitional stage to the fully ethical life of responsible 
choice. Climacus’ ironist identifies neither with the finite, empirical self of his immediate, 
conditioned existence, nor with the infinite, unconditioned ironic self of pure choice, but with 
the contradiction between the two. From the vantage point of his unconditioned, ironic 
distance, he thus regards his conditioned, finite existence not as a set of constraints to be 
rejected, but as “a home in which he chooses to dwell.”51 The ironist does not abandon, but 
returns to his finite, worldly existence, and takes responsibility for it. As John Evan Seery 
rather similarly puts it, the spirit of irony requires one “to return to the finite world of politics, 
to act in and for such a world, even in the face of knowledge that puts the world and that 
activity into perspective.”52  
As we have seen above, the reformation of spatial relations involves a self-distancing 
from the shared world of place, one which can seem to lead inexorably to the placeless 
experience of modern life – of space as a mere objective container, or as a mere subjective 
phantasm.  Yet if the modern distancing from place is followed by the return gesture of re-
entering the world with a new sense of reflexivity towards and responsibility for the 
attachment one feels for one’s place, the meaning and significance of the shared living space 
of human existence does not have to be eroded. On the contrary, it is only through the ironic 
negation of received meanings that space and place can be re-formed as a fit dwelling place 
for ethical freedom and responsibility. If we can learn to experience space as consisting of 
places that are neither unique nor equivalent, that neither define us nor leave us indifferent; if 
we can recognise that the post-Reformation distancing from place should make it possible to 
relate to places not less but more fully; then we will know a spirit of place that is at once 
grounded and open to the wider spaces of justice – a spirit of place that is our own. 
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